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ETHICAL PRACTICE AND CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
 
 
Nigel Duncan* 
 
DRAFT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article is designed to explore a variety of ways in which clinical methods can achieve 
the goals of educators and the professions in the preparation of student lawyers. In particular 
I intend to show how clinical methods assist in the development of:   a deeper understanding of the law, and the law in context;  general transferable skills;  legal professional skills;  a sound values basis for ethical practice.1 
In addition, I hope to show that there are ways of using clinical methods which may also 
assist us to meet other social concerns such as the extension of legal services and individual 
knowledge of rights, throughout the community.  
 
This article is based on the UK system of legal education, whereby a degree, usually of three 
years, is followed by a one-year vocational course (the Legal Practice Course for solicitors 
and the Bar Vocational Course for barristers) then an apprenticeship of two years’ training 
contract for solicitors or one year pupillage for barristers.2 However, some of the examples I 
will draw on relate to differently-structured legal education systems such as that in the USA 
and I believe that my remarks are of general application. In order to provide concrete 
examples to illustrate my arguments I have drawn extensively on the course of which I have 
most experience: the Bar Vocational Course at my own institution, the Inns of Court School 
of Law (ICSL). Other providers may have differently-structured courses, but all are validated 
by the Bar Council, and are expected to meet the same standards. The degree to which 
clinical methods are adopted varies, but (as defined below) is, to some extent, a feature of all 
the courses. 
 
 
Clinical methods in Professional Legal Education. 
 
The concept of ‘clinical’ methods is derived from medical training where doctors learn by 
practising first on simulated and later real patients. I define clinical methods of learning as 
those which require students to learn by undertaking the tasks that lawyers undertake in such 
a way that they have an opportunity to reflect on the law with which they work, the 
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 These are among the central qualities sought in legal education by the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory 
Committee on Legal Education and Conduct (ACLEC 1996) pp. 24-5. 
2
 For an explanation of the current system of professional legal education in England and Wales, see 
Duncan 2004a. Change may be imminent. The Law Society is currently conducting a Training 
Framework Review. The current state of consultation suggests a relaxation of specific requirements for 
courses, provided individuals can demonstrate that they have achieved the ‘Day 1 Outcomes’. This is 
highly controversial and it is premature to predict what will emerge from the consultation process. 
However, it is worth noting that the importance of addressing ethical issues is recognised and that 
clinical methods appear to be highly regarded (Law Society, 2005) 
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circumstances and relationships they encounter in that work and the development of their 
own skills and understanding. This may be done through simulated exercises, through taking 
on responsibility for real clients in the law school setting or through working with lawyers, 
judges or others providing advice or representation.3 To ensure that using these methods goes 
beyond mere skill development is a demanding requirement to which most providers of 
professional courses aspire, but are still working towards. 
 
On the Bar Vocational course students learn three adjectival law subjects: Evidence, Civil 
Litigation and Criminal Litigation and six skills: Case Preparation (incorporating Legal 
Research and Fact Management), Advocacy, Conference Skills, Negotiation, Opinion 
Writing and Drafting. They also study two options. Professional Conduct is taught both in 
discrete classes and integrated as a pervasive topic into the other learning programmes. In 
describing the use of clinical methods I will be concentrating mostly on the skills 
development and option courses.  
 
Within the skills development programme I shall concentrate on Conference Skills as a 
model of how we use these techniques. Students are given a manual (Samwell-Smith 2004) 
which is a guide to the development of effective client conference skills. They have three 
introductory Large Group sessions which illustrate the underlying principles. They also give 
students an opportunity to discover for themselves how difficult it can be to prepare for and 
conduct an effective conference by conducting a client conference in these Large Group 
classes. These also provide students with video demonstrations of conferences which they are 
able to discuss and criticise, informed by their experience of attempting a conference on the 
same case papers. This barely qualifies as clinical work, although it is certainly interactive. 
The tutorial programme which follows these involves simulated clinical techniques. Students 
work with realistic bundles of papers just as if they were being instructed by a solicitor. They 
are given opportunities to discuss how they have prepared for the conference, and then to 
carry it out, with fellow-students taking the role of client. After an opportunity for feedback 
the students who have played client then carry out a conference as counsel.  
 
Reinforcement of learning is approached by requiring students to keep a Professional 
Development File in which there are pro-forma sheets encouraging them to reflect upon their 
performance at these tasks. Thus their learning engages the process of Kolb’s learning cycle 
(Kolb 1984) to ensure that they undergo a process of reflection upon their developing skills 
and understanding, which should inform their subsequent planning and preparation for their 
next client conference. All colleagues managing an over-full curriculum will recognise that 
opportunities for reflection in classes are few and far between. 
 
Students have a series of such simulations, progressive in difficulty and in the issues covered. 
It is worth observing that they also go through similar programmes in the other skills, which 
tend to reinforce each other as there are many underlying skills (research, analytical, 
language and communication) which are in varying degrees common to all these skills. 
 
This, with appropriate adaptations to meet (for example) the requirements of the written 
skills is the basis for the learning of all the skills and the options. One option, however, is 
approached differently. This is the Free Representation Unit Option in which students learn 
by representing real clients in the Employment Tribunals. The rationale behind this course is 
fully presented elsewhere (Duncan 1997). The Free Representation Unit (FRU) is supported 
by the Bar and provides tribunal representation for impecunious clients whose claims did not 
attract legal aid. Many of our students undertake cases for FRU on a voluntary basis while 
they are studying and it is always a valuable experience. The FRU option, however, requires 
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students to write a reflective journal while they go through FRU’s training and assessment, 
which they must pass before they undertake their own cases. They may then choose one of 
those cases to present for formal assessment. They are assessed on their reflective journal as 
well as their actions representing their client. These journals usually show how they have 
reflected upon the ethical dilemmas they encounter. This is an example of real-client clinical 
education.4  
 
 
Reflective Practice 
 
The concept of reflection is fundamental to the clinical approaches presented here. It is 
designed to entrench learning from experience. As Gary Blasi has observed, we all know 
people who appear to have repeated the same 20 years experience while learning very little. 
Others appear to have learnt something new from each of their 20 years’ experience. The 
difference, Blasi argues, is reflecting on experience.5 This is a crucial element of David 
Kolb’s learning cycle (which through further progressive iterations becomes a learning 
spiral) and was developed in respect of professional practice by Donald Schön.  
 
There are many ways of encouraging students to engage in reflective practice. Opportunities 
to reflect on simulated clinical experience can be provided through a structured professional 
development plan.6 These take many forms. I have already mentioned the professional 
development file used at ICSL which encourages students to engage in a Kolbian learning 
spiral. This is designed to assist students to approach further iterations of a particular type of 
activity (eg a client conference) having thought hard, on the basis of experience and 
feedback, about how best to build on their strengths and to overcome perceived weaknesses. 
 
Real client experiences provide opportunities for different types of reflection. Where students 
take on real cases in ‘firms’ or tutorial groups, the tutor will facilitate sessions where students 
discuss their work and critique what they have been doing. This can both improve the 
continuing work on behalf of the client and help students to understand the qualities of their 
work to date and what to do to improve those areas which are less developed. Another 
common approach to using reflection on real client work is to help to contextualise and add a 
critical perspective to more conventional studies which have already taken place, or which 
run alongside the clinical experience. Thus Laura Lundy (1995) describes how her students’ 
work in advice centres led them to reflect on what they had learnt on a Welfare Law module. 
This enabled a more effective academic understanding of those rules themselves by providing 
experience of how they work in practice, and also, at a meta-level, of the very capacity of 
rules to provide solutions.  
 
‘Reflective practice’ has acquired iconic status amongst educationalists. There is, however, 
limited empirical evidence of its effectiveness. The theoretical justifications are impressive 
(Kolb and Schön, above) and the common-sense approach: ‘how can it be other than good to 
get students thinking hard about their own experience as opposed to simply blundering into 
another experience’ may convince many. Empirical evidence is inherently hard to come by. It 
would be unethical to impose on students a method the teacher considered to be inferior. It is, 
of course, possible to do year-on-year comparisons with past cohorts having introduced a 
reflective method. However, here the other variables are enormous and virtually impossible 
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to control for. Guidance on using reflective methods in the context of legal education is 
available in Hinett (2003). 
 
 
The benefits of using clinical methods 
 
Using clinical methods can produce considerable and diverse benefits.7 The individual skills 
students have been developing tend to fall into place when they have the responsibility of 
undertaking a real case. The need for effective fact management and legal research becomes 
frighteningly obvious as the date of their hearing approaches. Perceiving how real people are 
affected by the court system can provide profound insights. As one of my students has 
commented in her reflection on the experience:  
 
‘It has helped me to understand civil procedure in context, fact management, 
conference and negotiation skills in reality and the power we possess over people’s 
lives.’ 
 
The different approaches to clinic have their own advantages and disadvantages. Using 
simulations8 enables a considerable degree of control over each student’s experience and 
enables the course designer to ensure a progressive experience over a period of time. 
Students share their experiences and are thus able to reflect collectively on what they have 
worked through, providing each other with feedback on their performances and thus 
developing their ability to use each other as a learning resource. Simulations can be designed 
so that individuals work alone or in groups. They enable teachers to present situations from 
the perspectives of different parties to the issue.9 It is almost impossible for students to avoid 
some active engagement with their studies where these techniques are adopted. Finally, 
students usually enjoy their learning and this makes the results of that learning more likely to 
stick. 
 
However enjoyable and valuable a course based on simulations may be, however, it has its 
limitations. My students on the BVC report that after several months they become 
accustomed to interviewing each other, to negotiating with each other and to attempting 
advocacy in each other’s presence. What had been exciting and new becomes ordinary. We 
can respond in some ways to this within the concept of simulations. When they start working 
on their options we change their groups, so that they are working with relative strangers. We 
also provide them with opportunities (on a voluntary basis) to advise real clients in our in-
house advice clinics or by working with one of our Pro Bono Partners10. These initiatives 
help, but ultimately the students know that in the class room they are just working through 
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 This would not be agreed by all. There are many criticisms of using clinical techniques. They include 
the view that it is anti-intellectual and only concerned with skill development; that it is an inefficient use 
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methods. There is no doubt that it can be resource-intensive (but see text below for methods of sharing 
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narrowly with skill development fails to achieve the potential benefits of clinic. The concern for 
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valuable is the understanding of legal concepts made concrete through the application of rules to real 
(or realistic) cases, and the ability to analyse fact patterns and undertake the necessary legal research to 
enable knowledge and understanding of the changing law. Clinic can achieve this.  
8
 The use of simulations is developed in Burridge 1998. 
9
 The way this is used in vocationally-oriented courses in the Netherlands is presented in Reijntjes & 
Valcke 1998. For a more recent presentation of related approaches in Scotland and the Netherlands see 
Maharg and Muntjiewerff 2002 at p. 320. 
10
 For details of these programmes see http://www.city.ac.uk/icsl/current_students/pro_bono/index.html. 
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exercises. They know that if it goes wrong it does not really matter (until it comes to their 
summative assessments). 
 
This is where working with real clients comes in. On the FRU option my students represent 
clients with complaints of discrimination and unfair dismissal. These clients are generally 
poor and often unemployed. Their claim is of central importance to them, and if the student 
was not aware of that before taking on the case they are as soon as they have had their first 
client conference. The motivating effect of taking on a real case is wonderful to see. I have 
seen students whose application in classes was poor putting vast amounts of work into 
preparing for their tribunal case, and every hour of work provides an hour with learning 
potential. 
 
The quality of the learning in a real situation is also different. Representing a real client, 
faced with real opponents, advocating in real tribunals, students know that they are learning 
about the realities of practice. The care with which they prepare their case and the 
requirement to reflect upon the process usually produce a deeper learning.11 
 
Work with simulations is, of course a valuable preparation for taking on real cases and I 
would not recommend that students take on the sole responsibility for a client’s case until 
late in their legal education process. However, successful examples of real client work at the 
undergraduate stage12 give individual students much more support. For a start they work in 
teams (often described as firms) and their work is subject to the supervision of a tutor who is 
normally also a solicitor. Thus they assist each other with the actual tasks of advising and 
representation, their work is checked before it goes out, and they have regular team meetings 
which provide the basis for learning from each others’ reflection on their work and their 
developing understanding.13 
 
I have so far addressed clinical experience for students on undergraduate or vocational 
courses. In the United Kingdom all lawyers pass through an apprenticeship after their 
vocational course: a training contract in the case of solicitors and a pupillage in the case of 
barristers. At this point they naturally come into contact with real cases and may be given 
considerable responsibility for them. Well supervised, this can be valuable clinical legal 
education. Why then not wait until that stage to introduce this experience? In my view this 
can partly be answered by the way in which clinical experience can inform every other 
learning experience in both undergraduate and vocational courses. It makes sense of what 
might be abstruse. It makes concrete what might remain abstract. It should therefore form 
part of that experience, not follow it. However, there is another reason why I believe that 
clinical work should form part of the law school experience, but I will leave that until I have 
introduced my next proposal. 
 
 
Using clinical methods to develop professional values 
 
In many countries the legal profession is perceived as being in an ethical crisis. In the United 
States lawyers are often perceived to be highly unethical in their practice, particularly as that 
practice moves from a professional to a business orientation (Kronman 1993). This public 
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 By ‘deep’ learning I mean that which involves the student in linking old and new knowledge to 
personal experience and distinguishes evidence and argument. By contrast ‘surface’ learning refers to 
an unreflective, externally-driven focus on words and sentences. In a deep approach, students seek to 
understand; in a surface approach they seek only to reproduce. (LeBrun & Johnstone 1994, p. 59-61). 
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practice, see Kerrigan and Hall (2003). 
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perception is all the more galling for the majority who take matters of professional conduct 
seriously. Recent changes in the UK, such as the introduction of conditional fee 
agreements,14 raise new prospects for conflicts of interest and new pressures for unethical 
behaviour which will face our trainees as they enter the profession. The responsibility for 
addressing this lies with both established practitioners and legal educators.15 
 
Courses in professional responsibility are a required element of the JD in the USA. However, 
they are widely criticised, in many cases because they attempt little more than rote-learning 
of the Codes of Conduct and the Commentaries that have been developed to flesh out the 
Codes (Pipkin, 1979 and Granfield, 1998). Matters are improving and there are honourable 
exceptions: Columbia,16 Georgia State,17 Georgetown,18 amongst others. 
 
We as legal educators must ensure that our students learn their Codes of Conduct and 
practise within them. However, Codes are subject to interpretation and can never anticipate 
every situation which may arise. In terms of formal assessment, it may be that it is only 
compliance with the Codes, rather than an ethical response to an area left grey by the Codes, 
that can be subject to ‘Pass/Fail’ judgements. But learning does not have to be restricted to 
what can be formally assessed. We clearly also have a responsibility to do all we can to give 
our students a solid values-base on which to prepare their responses to the ethical dilemmas 
which will face them.  
 
On the BVC at ICSL we have a number of methods of addressing ethical issues. We provide 
students with a Manual which contains the Bar’s Code of Conduct, discussion of the broader 
ethical context and a series of practical problems. This Manual (Stead 2004) contains a 
chapter entitled The Letter and Spirit of the Code (Duncan 2004b). This is designed to ensure 
that students realise that their responsibilities go beyond simple compliance with the Code. 
Where the Code permits alternative actions or where it is capable of different interpretations 
students are encouraged to explore the underlying values which inform the Code. 
Recognising that there may be conflicts between those values or indeed between the values of 
the profession and their own personal values helps to situate their responses to ethical 
dilemmas in richer soil than the Code alone can provide. 
 
The Manual is supported by a series of large and small group classes. Practitioners present 
the issues arising from a number of case studies for discussion with students.  In small 
groups, students role-play realistic situations which have been designed to contain embedded 
ethical dilemmas, to put their ideas into practice and then have opportunities to discuss and 
reflect upon their experience. This is an example of simulated clinical work. Moreover, 
throughout the series of simulated activities that students undertake in their skills 
development programmes ethical problems arise. Some of these are inherent (as where a 
student asks her client leading questions in conference, thus receiving confirmation of her 
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 Agreements whereby the lawyer receives no fee unless the outcome of the litigation is a success, in 
which case a standard fee plus an uplift based on the likelihood of success is payable. 
15
 The responsibility of legal education was recognised in the UK by ACLEC, who included ‘legal 
values’ amongst what legal education should achieve and defined these as: 
‘… a commitment to the rule of law, to justice, fairness and high ethical standards, to acquiring and 
improving professional skills, to representing clients without fear or favour, to promoting equality of 
opportunity, and to ensuring that adequate legal services are provided to those who cannot afford to pay 
for them. These values are acquired not only throughout the legal educational process but also over 
time through socialisation within the legal professions.’ (emphasis in the original) (ACLEC 1996, p. 
24.) 
16
 See discussion of the clinical programme at Columbia in Brayne, Duncan and Grimes (1998) at p. 
220-8. 
17
 See http://law.gsu.edu/ccunningham/PR/ 
18
 See http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_clusters.cfm?Status=Cluster&Detail=25  
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pre-suppositions, rather than getting the client’s actual instructions). Others are built into the 
problem by asking those playing clients to introduce requests that place the student in an 
ethical dilemma.19 This is a clinical approach because the student is faced actually, not 
hypothetically, with the situation to be resolved, and after the role-play is completed there is 
an opportunity to discuss and reflect on the best ways of dealing with such a problem.  
 
More profound opportunities to recognise the impact of ethical dilemmas arise in real-client 
clinical situations. Students undertaking the FRU Option regularly encounter such dilemmas. 
The requirement of keeping a reflective journal significantly increases the likelihood that 
they will learn from such a situation. Here is one example of a student encountering an 
ethical dilemma. In an employment tribunal case where the client had been paid without 
deduction of tax the student was carrying out a telephone interview with his client using the 
client’s daughter as a translator. The student (who spoke the client’s language to a fair degree 
and had informed the client of that fact) overheard the client resisting his wife’s suggestion 
that he should lie about his understanding of the tax situation. He pre-empted the daughter by 
indicating that he had heard the conversation. His reflective journal records: 
 
‘In a sense I had averted an embarrassing situation by shooting first and not letting 
them tell me lies. On the other hand, should I not have waited until they came back to 
me with an answer (albeit a lie) aimed at me? Or would that have been unethical? 
Maybe I was exaggerating my ethical duty and should have just pretended not to hear. 
But then again maybe they should not have spoken that loudly (I could not not hear).’20 
 
This student was faced directly with a clash between the values of client autonomy and duty 
to the court.  
 
In a taught situation, students are more likely to respond to ethical dilemmas if permitted to 
raise them themselves. To do this one can devise a role-play which is value-laden and focus 
initial discussion on the skills elements. Students will usually raise the values dimension and 
are likely to accept the results of that discussion more as they will feel a greater ownership of 
the issues (Koh-Peters, 1998, p. 2). However, this goal may be more effectively achieved on 
the vocational courses if there has been a sound underpinning of ethical debate in students’ 
undergraduate experience. How might this best be done? 
 
Julian Webb (1996) proposes a three-stage approach to meet the normal structure of an 
English or Welsh law degree. In the first year a foundation course (such as Legal System) 
would explore as part of its remit the ethics of the English legal system. This lends a values 
context to the subsequent skills-oriented work. A simulated clinical element would be 
introduced in the second year in a ‘Legal Profession and Ethics’ course which would 
combine discussion of professional ethics with a study of the major ethical traditions 
supported by working through realistic and value-laden simulations. The third stage would be 
a real client clinical course through which supervisors would facilitate students’ application 
of their ideas and understanding of ethical issues to the discussions of how to conduct real 
cases.21 
 
Such a programme, particularly if the ethical issues are reinforced by being addressed in a 
number of different subjects, will provide the ideal basis for students to undertake a more 
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 For example, a client accused of an offence of dishonesty may ask counsel whether she would be 
guilty if a particular event had happened. To answer such a hypothetical question would breach the 
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 This extract has been published previously in Brayne, Duncan & Grimes (1998), p. 170. 
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 For a critical commentary on this proposal, suggesting how this be improved by integration through 
simulation into other subjects on the degree programme, see Evans (1998a). 
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focussed study of professional ethics on their vocational courses. The earlier opportunity to 
look critically at the issues provides a remedy for the tendency in many vocational courses to 
concentrate on the Codes, rather than their underlying values.22 It supports attempts to 
consider the underlying values and fundamental tenets of the Codes. 
 
 
The impact of legal education on students’ values 
 
It is inherently difficult to conduct research into the influences on students’ responses to 
ethical dilemmas. The issues are usually of such complexity that apparently different 
responses may have related values at their roots. However, there has been substantial 
research in the United States as to the impact of legal education on students’ attitudes 
towards the availability of legal services. This is clearly a matter of core professional values 
and is recognised by ACLEC (see the quote in footnote 8) as well as by the influential 
MacCrate Report (1992)23. 
 
The research explores this commitment by assessing students’ intention to undertake public 
interest work in the future. It consistently suggests that the proportion of students who are 
committed to including public interest work in their future professional activities declines as 
they work through their legal education process (Kubey, 1976; Erlanger & Klegon, 1978; 
Stover & Erlanger, 1989; Erlanger, Epp, Cahill & Haines, 1996; Stone 1997). For example, 
Stover found that while 33% of first year students rated public interest practice as their ideal 
first job, three years later the proportion had fallen to 16%. These studies also showed a 
decline in the importance law students paid to doing pro bono or social reform work. By 
contrast, Maresh (1997) shows evidence that undertaking a clinical programme with real 
clients reverses this trend. Over six years she found a consistent tendency for a higher 
proportion of students to express an interest in public interest work after taking their clinical 
course than they had before taking it. It might be objected that the students opting for clinical 
courses would most probably be those motivated towards public interest work. However, this 
does not explain the increase as a result of the experience and the percentage of students 
expressing the interest before their clinical course was as low as 25% in one year.24  
 
This suggests that in respect of one major value of the legal profession, not only does 
conventional legal education tend to undermine that value, but that the process is reversed by 
students undertaking clinical work which brings them into contact with real clients. I do not, 
of course, extrapolate from this that those who are not concerned with the availability of legal 
services will necessarily act unethically in other aspects of their practice. However, I would 
suggest that those with a concern for some of the profession’s core values are likely to be 
willing to consider other core values seriously. What is more, those dealing with real cases 
within their educational experience will perforce have come into contact with the ethical 
issues that are endemic in legal practice and will not have been able to evade them. They will 
have been under a duty to take decisions and actions.  
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 These approaches are not restricted to the UK legal education system. For an example of integrating 
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 MacCrate identified four ‘fundamental values of the profession’ each of which generates a ‘special 
responsibility’. Thus the value of competent representation begets responsibility to clients; and 
(significantly here) the value of striving to promote justice, fairness and morality begets public 
responsibility for the legal system. 
24
 It is true that other studies have shown that students take clinical courses to gain practical experience 
rather than because of their desire to practise in a particular area (Abel, 1990). This, however, does not 
undermine the significance of Maresh’s findings. 
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Furthermore, their experience will have addressed ethical issues in a way hard to achieve 
without clinical experience. Surveys in the USA have shown that ethics courses (compulsory 
since the Watergate debacle) are perceived as inferior (Pipkin 1979). In a study by Granfield 
(1998 at p. 308):   
‘only three out of forty respondents characterized their ethics course as valuable 
preparation for legal practice. The vast majority reported that their ethics course 
merely provided them with formalistic instruction about the rules of professional 
responsibility that were largely silent on the fundamental contradictions inherent in 
their practice.’  
 
It is the experience of real clients in all the messy complexity of real cases that overcomes 
this problem.25 
 
 
Why not leave this to the apprenticeship stage? 
 
I have already suggested above that clinical experience increases the value of other 
educational experience with which it is integrated. There is a further reason why it is 
important that it not be left until the vocational course is finished. This is a point which must 
be expressed with some care, as it risks offending the majority of lawyers who strive to 
maintain high ethical standards in their practice. It requires two assertions which I shall draw 
from the work of others. The first is that:  
‘… it is workplace experiences that have the greatest impact on shaping professional 
behavior. Ethical education may be eclipsed if law students encounter workplaces 
that are unsympathetic to ethical practice.’ (Myers, 1996 at p. 824) 
The second is that:  
‘… for those students whose first significant work place experience is a ‘live client’ 
clinical programme, better values, social awareness and motivations are inculcated 
because students are under the control of legal educators rather than ‘the market’.’ 
(Evans, 1998b at p. 284) 
 
This is not intended to be a criticism of all practitioners. Practitioners reading this journal are 
clearly concerned for the quality of legal education and will be taking care to ensure that their 
trainees would be given appropriate instruction in ethical practice. However, this cannot be 
true of every lawyer who accepts the responsibility for a trainee. The realities of practice will 
properly expose trainees to the market and the adversarial nature of litigation. As Auerbach 
has observed:  
‘Litigation expresses a chilling Hobbesian view of human nature. It accentuates 
hostility, not trust. Selfishness supplants generosity. Truth is shaded by dissembling. 
Once an adversarial framework is in place, it supports competitive aggression to the 
exclusion of reciprocity and empathy.’ (Auerbach, 1983 at vii) 
These are the pressures which can lead to conflicts of interest or other ethical difficulties. 
Evans does not argue that students should be protected from those pressures, rather that they 
should first experience them in an environment in which it is possible to explore the 
problems in principle. For these reasons, students should be exposed to realistic (or ideally, 
real) problem situations in the context of their academic and vocational courses, in order to 
provide them with a sound foundation in values which will strengthen their ability to deal 
with the vicissitudes of practice. 
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 This is reminiscent of Donald Schön’s swamp (Schön 1987) and the difficulty of recognising the 
problems of living in the swamp if you stay on the academic high ground. 
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Meeting our social responsibilities 
 
One of the founding characteristics of the codes of professional ethics is the responsibility to 
promote justice and accessibility of legal services.26 Currently most Governments are seeking 
ways to reduce spending on the public funding of litigation. This raises questions as to how 
any ensuing gaps in provision might be filled.27 Law schools, whether dealing with the 
academic or vocational stages of legal education, which develop real client clinical 
programmes may provide a valuable social service to those clients. This may include the 
provision of legal advice, full representation in appropriate circumstances, or it could include 
working with community or interest groups to address perceived injustices or to empower 
community groups to recognise and meet their own needs. This could be addressed by law 
schools setting up their own student law clinics,28 working with other agencies such as (in the 
UK) Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, Law Centres and Advice Centres,29 or working in a 
community legal education programme (Jones (1997) p. 247).30 There has been considerable 
development of these programmes in recent years, often under the title ‘Street Law’.31 The 
burgeoning scope for work of this kind in the UK is presented in Brayne (2002) and Grimes 
(2003). Those interested in the international development of different projects involving law 
students learning through working with individuals or community groups should contact the 
Global Alliance for Justice Education through their website at 
<http://ls.wustl.edu/Academics/Faculty/Activities/Global/>. 
 
In recent years the UK Solicitors’ Pro Bono Group has actively promoted student work in a 
pro  bono capacity, in the hope that this will establish patterns of behaviour which will 
continue into practice32. This raises a number of issues. Lawyers struggling in publicly-
funded areas of practice often take a jaundiced view of lawyers with corporate client 
experience occasionally offering voluntary work in a field of which they have little current 
experience. There is the broader issue of whether undertaking pro bono work (whether as a 
practitioner or a student) undermines attempts to persuade the Government to accept what 
many would regard as their responsibility to fund proper levels of access to legal services.  
 
This issue becomes particularly pertinent when recent developments by some UK universities 
are considered. They have entered agreements with the Legal Services Commission to 
provide legal services. High standards of supervision and client care are required, but where 
funding comes from both the LSC and the university there is the potential for conflict 
between educational and serviced-delivery interests. Tensions can arise over the choice of 
cases accepted or the period of time over which they are likely to be ‘live’. This is a complex 
issue which cannot be fully explored here, but which requires careful management if justice 
is to be done to both students and clients. Properly conceived and managed, careful co-
operation between the legal education community and the various bodies concerned to 
provide legal services can produce something of mutual value. 
 
                                                 
26
 Op cit. nn. 15 & 23. 
27
 I do not argue that we should simply accept that government minimise or abandon its responsibility 
for the provision of proper legal services to those who cannot afford it. However, when faced with 
clients with an unmet legal need it is incumbent upon us to consider how to contribute to meeting that 
need while maintaining a principled pressure on government. 
28
 For practical guidance see Brayne, Duncan & Grimes, (1998) ch. 3. 
29
 Ibid. ch. 4. See also Kibble (1998). 
30
 For students to prepare an explanation of a particular legal issue appropriate for a lay audience or 
readership requires high levels of understanding of that issue as well as communication skills and a 
sensitivity to the needs of those to whom they are explaining it. 
31
 For information and guidance see the Street Law website at: http://www.streetlaw.org/. 
32
 See http://www.students.probonogroup.org.uk/ 
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The characteristics of clinical educators 
 
I will conclude by considering what we need of clinical teachers. It seems to me that there are 
two essential characteristics. One is that they have a sufficient understanding and practice of 
educational theory to be able to design and implement experiences for students which will 
maximise their opportunities for deep learning. The second is that they should have the 
experience of practice which is necessary for them to act as effective supervisors of their 
students’ attempts to advise and represent their clients. Neither alone is sufficient. 
 
It may not always be possible to find individuals who combine both types of experience. 
Where this is the case it is essential that teams are developed which include individuals with 
each type of expertise. For example, my practice experience is limited. I therefore collaborate 
on my FRU option with one teaching colleague with considerable experience of litigation in 
the Employment Tribunals33 and the employment case-worker at FRU, whose practice 
experience in this field is unparalleled. Between us we can provide learning opportunities 
which are real, properly supported, and which build in the opportunities for reflection which 
ensure a truly educational experience. Working collaboratively in this way also provides a 
good model for the students and I would commend it to anyone. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the use of clinical methods of legal education (as presented in the concrete 
examples in this article and through different models developed elsewhere) provides an 
effective method of meeting a number of our concerns in professional legal education.34 It 
provides the most powerful experience of the real context in which the law operates; it is the 
most effective way of developing transferable and specific professional skills and it provides 
a sound basis for ethical practice. It works most effectively when reinforced with built-in 
requirements for reflection and approaches to curriculum design which expect students to 
take some responsibility for their own learning. This experience should precede the training 
contract or pupillage. In designing courses which meet these objectives we can also help with 
the provision of legal services to those who cannot afford to pay for them. These proposals 
have been based on the experience of a number of jurisdictions which have very different 
legal education structures. How best to implement this approach in different jurisdictions will 
vary, but experience to date suggests that the effort is eminently worthwhile.  
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